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I. INTRODUCTION
Conventional wisdom tells us that nothing is more accurate
than hindsight. Unfortunately, it is rare indeed when hindsight
can accomplish much more than painfully to prepare us for simi-
lar future events that usually do not occur. Broad observations of
hindsight are as true in the estate planning area as they are in
life generally. One of those rare areas in which one can act upon
hindsight beneficially is in the renunciation or disclaimer of
gifts. In certain instances, if all the factors are present, it is
sometimes possible to convert a gift that has unfavorable conse-
quences into a gift with favorable consequences. This article will
define and discuss the uses of renunciations and disclaimers in
South Carolina generally, and will analyze relevant postmortem
pitfalls and opportunities involving their use.
A. What Are Renunciations and Disclaimers?
The terms "renunciation" and "disclaimer" are synony-
mous, but the term "disclaimer" will be used throughout this
article because it is the term that is used in the Internal Revenue
Code. A disclaimer has been defined by Treasury Department
regulations under the Internal Revenue Code as a complete and
unqualified refusal to accept the ownership of property.' Other
1. Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(c) (1958) provides in pertinent part:
Where the law governingthe administration of the decedent's estate gives a
beneficiary, heir, or next-of-kin a right to completely and unqualifiedly refuse
2
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regulations2 note that there is a distinction between a disclaimer
of a property interest on the one hand, and the acceptance and
subsequent disposal of that interest on the other; the latter ac-
tion does not constitute a disclaimer. The 1976 Tax Reform Act'
introduced the term "qualified disclaimer"' and provided that
to accept ownership of property transferred from a decedent (whether the
transfer is effected by the decedent's will or by the law of descent and distribu-
tion of intestate propeity), a refusal to accept ownership does not constitute the
making ofsa gift if the refusal is made within a reasonable time after knowledge
of the existence of the transfer.
This regulation was adopted on November 15, 1958, prior to the adoption of I.R.C. §
2518 as a part of the Tax Reform Act of 1976. Except for the fact that § 2518 now im-
poses a specified rather than a "reasonable" time, the quoted language of the regulation
appears to remain an accurate description of a disclaimer.
2. Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(d)-(1) (1958) provides in part: "A disclaimer is a complete
and unqualified refusal to accept the rights to which one is entitled. It is, therefore, nec-
essary to distinguish between the surviving spouse's disclaimer of a property interest and
her acceptance and subsequent disposal of a property interest." This regulation was
adopted on June 24, 1958, prior to the adoption of § 2518 of the Tax Reform Act of 1976.
The quoted language nevertheless remains correct.
3. 1976 Tax Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520-1933.
4. I.R.C. § 2518(b). I.R.C. § 2518 has an effective date of January 1, 1977, and ap-
plies to disclaimers of interests created on or after that date. H.R. RE'. No. 1380, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. 67, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 3356, 3421. Section
2518 provides:
(a) General rule.-For purposes of this subtitle, if a person makes a qualified
disclaimer with respect to any interest in property, this subtitle shall apply
with the respect to such interest as if the interest had never been transferred to
such person.
(b) Qualified disclaimer defined.-For purposes of subsection (a), the term
"qualified disclaimer" means an irrevocable and unqualified refusal by a per-
son to accept an interest in property but only if-
(1) such refusal is in writing,
(2) such writing is received by the transferor of the interest, his legal
representative, or the holder of the legal title to the property to which
the interest relates not later than the date which is 9 months after the
later of-
(A) the day on which the transfer creating the interest in such
person is made, or
(B) the day on which such person attains age 21,
(3) such person has not accepted the interest or any of its benefits, and
(4) as a result of such refusal, the interest passes without any direction
on the part of the person making the disclaimer and passes either-
(A) to the spouse of the decedent, or
(B) to a person other than the person making the disclaimer.
(c) Other rules.-For purposes of subsection (a)-
(1) Disclaimer of undivided portion of interest.-A disclaimer with re-
spect to an undivided portion of an interest which meets the require-
ments of the preceding sentence shall be treated as a qualified dis-
claimer of such portion of the interest.
3
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with respect to interests created after December 31, 1976, a dis-
claimer would be recognized for tax purposes only if it was a
qualified disclaimer5 under applicable provisions of the Internal
Revenue Code.
B. Benefits of Disclaimers
Succinctly stated, the benefits of disclaimers are those that
can be realized by a postmortem shifting of property interests
based upon hindsight. Such shifting is normally effected in order
to create a tax benefit. For example, individuals frequently use
disclaimers to increase the size of the surviving spouse's interest
in estate properties in order to increase the amount of the estate
tax marital deduction. Alternatively, if a surviving spouse has
received property with an aggregate value exceeding the maxi-
mum estate tax marital deduction, it may be possible for the
surviving spouse using a disclaimer to cause the excess to pass to
children or others, thus, reducing the size of the estate without
incurring a gift tax liability.'
C. Title Theories
There are two legal theories regarding the passage of title to
disclaimed property. Under one theory, the property is trans-
ferred by will or inter vivos gift and acceptance is presumed., If
the property is subsequently disclaimed, the disclaimer relates
back to the time that the gift was effective and title is consid-
ered never to have passed to the disclaimant. Under the other
theory, no transfer of title is made until there has been an ac-
ceptance and if a disclaimer occurs before acceptance, then title
never passed to the disclaimant8 Neither theory has been ex-
pressly accepted or rejected by the South Carolina Supreme
Court.
(2) Powers.-A power with respect to property shall be treated as an
interest in such property.
5. See H.R. REP. No. 1380, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 67, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 3356-3421. But see Private Letter Rulings 7913082, 7849009.
6. A comprehensive discussion of the advantages of disclaimers is found in L. NEW-
isN & A. KALTER, POSTMORTEM ESTATE PLANNING 13 (1976).
7. 6 PAGE ON THE LAW OF WILLS § 49.4 (W. Bowe & D. Parker eds. 1962) (citing, inter
alia, Perkins v. Isley, 224 N.C. 793, 32 S.E.2d 588 (1945)).
8. 6 PAGE ON THE LAw OF WILLS, supra note 7, § 49.4.
[Vol. 31
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To achieve the intended result and to be effective, a dis-
claimer must comply with a variety of statutory and common-
law requirements. It must meet the requirements of state prop-
erty law,' federal estate tax law,1" federal gift tax law," South
Carolina estate tax law, 12 and South Carolina gift tax law. 3
Prior to 1966, the Internal Revenue Service took the position
in its regulations" that it was not possible to increase the federal
estate tax marital deduction through the use of a disclaimer.
The theory was that if property passed to a surviving spouse by
reason of a disclaimer, such property had not passed to the sur-
viving spouse from the decedent and, therefore, did not qualify
for the estate tax marital deduction. The marital deduction stat-
ute was amended by Congress in 196615 to permit an increase in
the marital deduction by a disclaimer. Federal tax law regarding
disclaimers was again changed in the Tax Reform Act of 1976.16
The committee reports for the 1976 Tax Reform Act state that
the reason for changing the federal tax laws regarding disclaim-
ers was to achieve uniform treatment. This Congress clearly
9. South Carolina has no statute expressly permitting a disclaimer. Disclaimers of
gifts under a will have been permitted in Bahan v. Citizens & Southern Nat'l Bank of
S.C., 267 S.C. 303, 227 S.E.2d 671 (1976); Dabney v. Estes, 262 S.C. 336, 204 S.E.2d 387
(1974); and in Watson v. Wall, 229 S.C. 500, 93 S.E.2d 918 (1956).
10. I.R.C. § 2045. This statute provides only: "For provisions relating to the effect of
a qualified disclaimer for purposes of this chapter, see § 2518."
11. I.R.C. § 2518.
12. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 12-15-40, -60 (1976) (incorporating respectively I.R.C. §§
2031-2044 and §§ 2051-2056, as of December 31, 1975).
13. S.C. CODE AxN. § 12-17-40 (Cum. Supp. 1979) (incorporating I.R.C. §§ 2503,
2511-2517, and the deductions allowed in §§ 2522-2524 inclusive, as of December 31,
1975).
14. Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(d)-l(b) (1958). This regulation has never been rescinded
by the Internal Revenue Service, but was superseded by the adoption of I.R.C. §
2056(d)(1) on October 4, 1977. Section 2056(d) was itself repealed by the Tax Reform Act
of 1976 and replaced by §§ 2045, 2518.
15. I.R.C. § 2056(d)(1) (1966) (repealed 1976).
16. Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520 (1976) (adding I.R.C. §§ 2045, 2518)..
17. H.R. REP. No. 1380, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 67, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 3356, 3421, describes § 2518 as follows:
The bill provides definitive rules relating to disclaimers for purposes of the es-
tate, gift and generation-skipping transfer taxes. If the requirements of the pro-
vision are satisfied, a refusal to accept property is to be given effect for Federal
estate and gift tax purposes even if the applicable local law does not techni-
cally characterize the refusal as a "disclaimer" or if the person refusing the
property was considered to have been the owner of the legal title to the prop-
1980]
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failed to do.'8
Section 2518 of the Internal Revenue Code, adopted as a
part of the 1976 Tax Reform Act, contains the federal estate and
gift tax requirements for disclaimers of property. The Revenue
Act of 1978 slightly amended section 2518.19
Before the 1976 Tax Reform Act, the disclaimer provisions
in the federal estate and gift tax laws were scattered among
many sections of the Internal Revenue Code and regulations."
Because South Carolina has incorporated certain federal estate
and gift tax statutes as of December 31, 1975,21 disclaimers for
tax purposes in South Carolina must meet the requirements of
pre-1976 federal estate and gift tax laws.22
Finally, to be effective for tax purposes under both state and
federal tax laws, the disclaimer must be effective under local
property law. In other words, under local property law, when
property is disclaimed, the method of disclaiming must effec-
tively reject title to the property.23 If so, and if the method of
disclaiming meets the requirements of estate and federal tax
law, then there will be an effective disclaimer for tax and prop-
erty law purposes.
erty before refusing acceptance of the property.
18. See A. CASNER & R. STEIN, ESTATE PLANNING UNDER THE TAX REFORM Acr OF
1976, at 179 (1978) [hereinafter cited as ESTATE PLANNING]; J. McCoRD, 1976 ESTATE AND
GirT TAx REFORM 257 (1977).
19. Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 702(m)(1), 92 Stat. 2763 (adding I.R.C. § 2518(b)(4)(A)).
20. For example, (1) gifts generally-Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(c) (1958); (2) powers of
appointment-I.R.C. §§ 2041(a)(2), 2514(b), Treas. Reg. §§ 20.2041-3(d)(6) (1958),
25.2514o3(c)(5) (1958); (3) marital deduction-I.R.C. § 2056(d), Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(d)-
1 (1958); (4) charitable deduction-I.R.C. § 2055(a), Treas. Reg. § 20.2055-2(c) (1958);
(5) right of an individual to vest trust income or principal in himself-I.R.C. § 678(d),
Treas. Reg. § 1.678(d)-1 (1960). All of the disclaimer provisions of these statutes except §
678(d) were repealed by the Tax Reform Act of 1976, which substituted § 2518.
21. See notes 12-13 supra.
22. See id. However, the changes effected by § 2518 in the federal tax laws concern-
ing disclaimers appear more restrictive than the requirements of prior federal tax laws
and, therefore, it would appear that if the requirements of § 2518 are met, the require-
ments of South Carolina estate and gift tax law will probably also be met.
23. Although it seems to be clear that disclaimers of testate property can be made in
South Carolina, e.g., Bahan v. Citizens and Southern Nat'l Bank of S.C., 267 S.C. 303,
277 S.E.2d 671 (1976), there is practically no guidance available regarding how the dis-
claimer must be made. Presumably, if the requirements of § 2518 are complied with, the
disclaimer will be effectively made under South Carolina property law.
[Vol. 31
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III. UNIT DED CONSEQUENCES OF DIscLAimERs
The two most common mistakes in the use of disclaimers
are failure to meet the requirements of tax statutes and failure to
correctly anticipate the devolution of the ownership of the prop-
erty after it has been disclaimed. Each of these mistakes will be
considered in turn.
In some instances, if the disclaimer is effective under state
law to vest title to the disclaitned property in someone other
than the disclaimant, but fails to meet the tax requirements,
then the person who disclaims may be considered to have made
a gift to the person who ultimately receives the disclaimed prop-
erty. For example, in the 1952 case of Hardenbergh v. Commis-
sioner, 1 the decedent's wife and daughter each attempted to dis-
claim their intestate share of the decedent's estate, intending
that the decedent's son receive it. As a result of the disclaimers,
the administrators delivered to the son the property that had
been disclaimed. The Internal Revenue Service successfully as-
serted before the Eighth Circuit that the disclaimers were inef-
fective and that, because the purportedly disclaimed property
had been delivered to the son by an action of the decedent's wife
and daughter, the decedent's wife and daughter had made gifts
to the decedent's son of their share of the intestate's estate.,
Thus, the decedent's wife and daughter were required to pay a
gift tax on the property that they purportedly had disclaimed.
A different problem occurs when the devolution of the dis-
claimed property following the disclaimer has not been correctly
anticipated. For example, assume that B disclaims a testamen-
tary gift from A, believing that the property will be received by
C, but under the law the property passes to D. The tragic conse-
quences of this error are sometimes compounded by the fact that
the purpose of the disclaimer by B was to get the property to C,
the surviving spouse, in order to qualify for marital deduction.
Not only does the property devolve into the wrong hands, but
the marital deduction, which was the goal of the disclaimer, is
not allowed. Careful attention, therefore, must be paid to the re-
quirements of both the tax statutes and the devolutionary rules
of local property law.
24. 198 F.2d 63 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 836 (1952).
25. Id. at 66.
1980]
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IV. REQUIREMENTS OF AN EFFECTIVE DISCLAIMER
A. In General
For a disclaimer to be effective, it must meet the require-
ments of state and federal estate and gift tax laws as well as
state property laws. Many of these laws overlap in their require-
ments, but the most definitive and restrictive statement of re-
quirements is found in section 2518 of the Internal Revenue
Code: "For purposes of this suttitle, if a person makes a quali-
fied disclaimer with respect to any interest in property, this sub-
title shall apply with respect to such interest as if the interest
had never been transferred to such person."26 Section 2518 incor-
porates a new term in the Internal Revenue Code, the "qualified
disclaimer."
The first requirement for a qualified disclaimer is that it
constitute an "irrevocable and unqualified refusal by a person to
accept an interest in property." 2 This requirement traditionally
has been part of the definition of disclaimers. 21
The second requirement for a qualified disclaimer is that it
be in writing.' This requirement is commonly found in statutes
under local laws that permit disclaimers"° and is also found in
the Uniform Probate Code.31 A proposed form of written dis-
claimer is set forth at the end of this article as an appendix.
B. Timeliness
The third requirement is that the disclaimer be delivered
within a nine-month period.2 If the disclaimant is twenty-one
years of age or older when the interest in property is created, the
nine-month period begins on the date that the interest in the
property being disclaimed was created. The determination of the
date on which the interest is created, however, is based upon the
rules governing completed gifts. Congressional committee reports
provide: "For purposes of this requirement, a transfer is consid-
ered to be made when it is treated as a completed transfer for
26. I.R.C. § 2518(a).
27. I.R.C. § 2518(b).
28. J. McCoRD, supra note 18, at 246.
29. I.R.C. § 2518(b)(1).
30. See J. McCoRD, supra note 18, at 246.
31. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-801(a).
32. I.R.C. § 2518(b)(2).
674 [Vol. 31
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gift tax purposes with respect to inter vivos transfers or upon the
date of the decedent's death with respect to testamentary
transfers."' '
What are some examples of incomplete gifts? Two of the
most common examples are the revocable trust" and the joint
bank account.3 Even irrevocable trusts are incomplete gifts if
the grantor retains the power to alter or amend the trust by
changing the beneficiaries.
36
If the disclaimant is under twenty-one when the interest is
created, then the disclaimer must be delivered within nine
months after the later of the dates upon which (a) the interest is
created (and has become a completed gift) or (b) the disclaimant
attains the age of twenty-one.
37
Once the nine-month period begins to run, it is not delayed
or deferred because the donee or beneficiary is not aware that
the transfer has been made.3 Nor does the nature of the interest
as future or contingent affect the running of the nine-month pe-
riod, once it has begun. 39 It is clear that the statute was intended
to apply to future interests because the committee reports" refer
to and disapprove the result in the case of Keinath v. Commis-
sioner," which involved a bequest of a life estate to the dece-
dent's widow, remainder to his two sons. The widow survived the
decedent and died nineteen years later. Within several months of
her death, one of her two sons who was independently wealthy
disclaimed his remainder interest, causing that interest to pass
to his children. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held that
the disclaimer was timely because the period of time began to
run for the son only when his remainder interest became posses-
sory. Measured by that standard, the disclaimant renounced sev-
33. H.R. REP. No. 1380, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 67, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE
CONG. & An. NEvs 3356, 3421.
34. See Tress. Reg. § 25.2511-2(b) (1958).
35. See Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(h)(4) (1958).
36. See Tress. Reg. § 25.2511(2) (1958) for a description of the kinds of gifts that are
complete and those that are incomplete for gift tax purposes. Also, for a detailed discus-
sion of the timing problems created by § 2518(b)(2), see J. McCoRD, supra note 18, at
247-50.
37. I.R.C. § 2518(b)(2).
38. J. McCoRD, supra note 18, at 248.
39. Id.
40. H.R. REP. No. 1380, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 66, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 3356, 3420.
41. 480 F.2d 57 (8th Cir. 1973), rev'g, 58 T.C. 352 (1972).
1980]
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eral months after rather than nineteen years after receiving the
disclaimed property. Section 2518(b)(2) has overturned the
Keinath case, and it is now clear that a future interest must be
disclaimed within nine months of the time that the transfer be-
comes a completed gift and not within nine months of the time
that the interest becomes possessory. The same rule would seem
to apply to contingent gifts even though the contingency has not
occurred."
In addition to the nine-month period imposed by tax law,
local law also is said to impose its own time limitations for dis-
claimers, which is said to be a "reasonable time." The only refer-
ence to time limitations for disclaimers in South Carolina seems
to be the case of Watson v. Wall," which mentions that the dis-
claimer took place within the administration year. In Bahan v.
Citizens & Southern National Bank" the disclaimer was made
more than six months after the decedent's death. The question
of timeliness was not raised in any of the pleadings and was not
commented on by the court. The court apparently assumed that
the period of time within which the disclaimer was made was
reasonable. It also may be that whether the time is reasonable
depends upon whether the delay in disclaiming works any injury
to third parties.45
The application of section 2518(b)(2) to powers of appoint-
ment has created some special problems. The conference report
provides:
The conferees intend to make it clear that the 9-month period
for making a disclaimer is to be determined in reference to each
taxable transfer. For example, in the case of a general power of
appointment where the other requirements are satisfied, the
person who would be the holder of the power will have a 9-
month period after the creation of the power in which to dis-
claim and the person to whom the property would pass by rea-
son of the exercise or lapse of the power would have a 9-month
period after a taxable exercise, etc., by the holder of the power
in which to disclaim.6
42. J. McCoRD, supra note 18, at 253.
43. 229 S.C. 500, 93 S.E.2d 918 (1956).
44. 267 S.C. 303, 226 S.E.2d 671 (1976).
45. L. NEwMAN & A. KALTER, supra note 6, at 43 (citing, inter alia, Crumpler v.
Barfield & Wilson Co., 114 Ga. 570, 40 S.E. 808 (1902)).
46. H.R. RP. No. 1515, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 623-24 reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE
[Vol. 31
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Suppose that the power is a special rather than a general power
of appointment and the exercise of the special power is, there-
fore, not a taxable transfer. In such a case, if the special power is
exercised more than nine months after it is created, the person
to whom the property passes may be unable to effectively dis-
claim for tax purposes."
C. To Whom Must the Disclaimer Be Delivered?
Section 251848 requires that a written disclaimer be delivered
to the transferor of the interest, his legal representative, or the
holder of legal title to the property to which the interest relates.
Since the statute permits the disclaimer to be delivered to the
transferor of the interest, it is clear that the disclaimer statute is
intended to apply to lifetime gifts.49 The term "legal representa-
tive" undoubtedly means executor or administrator and the term
"holder of the legal title to the property to which the interest
relates" probably includes a trustee. It is also noteworthy that
these persons are described in the alternative.A0 Thus, if T ap-
points A his executor and devises property to B in trust for C, it
would appear that C can deliver his disclaimer either to A, his
executor, or to B, his trustee. Similarly, if D gives property to X
in trust for Y, Y's disclaimer can be delivered to D, as donor, or
to X, as trustee.
D. Acceptance of the Gift
1. In general. -Section 25181' requires that the disclaimant
must not have accepted the interest in the disclaimed property
or any of its benefits. Acceptance of property can be express or
implied.5 Acceptance of an interest which would be beneficial is
sometimes said to be presumed, 3 while acceptance of an interest
which would be burdensome is said not to be presumed. 4
2. By affirmative action. -Acceptance of property involves,
CONG. & AD. NEws 4118, 4262.
47. See generally J. McCoRD, supra note 18, at 249.
48. I.R.C. § 2518(b)(2).
49. J. McCORD, supra note 18, at 247.
50. Id.
51. I.R.C. § 2518(b)(3).
52. 6 PAGE ON THE LAW OF Wnus, supra note 7, § 49.6, (citing King v. Skellie, 79 Ga.
147, 3 S.E. 614 (1887)).
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among other things, receipt, use, enjoyment, dominion and/or
control over it. 5 It has other meanings as well. The committee
reports applicable to section 2518 provide: "In addition, the ac-
ceptance of any consideration in return for making the dis-
claimer is to be treated as an acceptance of the benefits of the
interest disclaimed." 5
The pitfalls created by the requirement that a disclaimant
not have accepted property prior to disclaiming it are well illus-
trated in the case of Krakoff v. United States.57 Anna and Abra-
ham Krakoff, husband and wife, were joint signatories on several
bank accounts and owned shares of stock jointly with right of
survivorship. Under local law, upon the death of a joint owner of
a bank account, the survivor was entitled to the proceeds. About
three months after Abraham's death, Anna executed disclaimers
of her interest in the joint bank accounts and the stock. As a
result of Anna's disclaimer a probate court in Ohio held that the
property passed under the will to Anna and the four surviving
children," with the children receiving two-thirds of the dis-
claimed property and Anna receiving one-third.
The Internal Revenue Service, however, successfully as-
serted that the disclaimers were ineffective. The issue raised by
the Service was not whether the disclaimer was timely but
whether Anna had accepted her interest in the stock and joint
bank accounts before disclaiming them. Anna stipulated59 that
prior to her husband's death she knew of the existence of the
joint bank accounts and of the shares of stock owned jointly,
that she had signed the bank signature cards for the opening of
the accounts, and that she had endorsed dividend checks from
the shares of stock held jointly. Based in part on that stipula-
tion, the court held that Anna could not disclaim her interest in
the joint stock or the joint bank accounts because she had previ-
ously accepted them.10 The court further held that the two-thirds
interest received by the children constituted a gift from Anna
55. Id. § 49.6. "It is sufficient if the devisee or legatee performs acts which show his
intention to accept at that time." Id.
56. H.R. REP. No. 1380, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 67 reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 3356, 3421.
57. 313 F. Supp. 1089 (S.D. Ohio), aft'd, 439 F.2d 1023 (6th Cir. 1971).
58. Estate of Krakoff, 18 Ohio App. 2d 116, 179 N.E.2d 566 (1961).
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upon which she would be required to pay a gift tax.6'
"Acceptance" in the Krakoff case appears to be based upon
affirmative acts by Anna, such as signing the signature cards,
making deposits and endorsing dividend checks. If the court was
correct in holding that the signing of a signature card on a joint
bank account is sufficient evidence of acceptance, then it would
seem that a joint bank account could never be disclaimed be-
cause a signature card will always be required by the bank at
which the account is located. The Krakoff case is a clear exam-
ple of the troublesome questions that accompany a disclaimer of
nontestamentary gifts.
62
61. Id. at 1028.
62. The federal court in Krakoff found that, under Ohio law, each joint depositor
was presumed rebuttably to be a co-owner of the account. 439 F.2d at 1026. This rule
may differ from the South Carolina rule. The South Carolina courts have not held that a
non-contributing joint depositor is a co-owner, at least during the life of the contributing
depositor. In Smith v. Planters Savings Bank, 124 S.C. 100, 117 S.E. 312 (1923), the
court held that a joint deposit (the funds in which were conceded to have belonged to the
decedent co-depositor) belonged to the decedent's estate and that the surviving co-depos-
itor had a mere power of attorney to withdraw the funds on deposit, which power was
revoked on the death of the decedent. The case was decided prior to the adoption of S.C.
CODE ANN. § 34-11-10 (1976), permitting banks to pay the proceeds of a joint account to
either co-depositor, whether or not the other co-depositor is living. In Hawkins v. Thax-
ton, 224 S.C. 445, 79 S.E.2d 714 (1954), the court permitted the payment of joint account
proceeds to a surviving co-depositor, based on the contractual relationship among the
depositors and the depository and a rebuttable presumption (that arose by virtue of § 34-
11-10) that the decedent intended the survivor to have and retain the funds on deposit
after the decedent's death. While the court may have implied that the co-depositors were
co-owners by stating that during the time both depositors were alive "both were entitled
to possession . . ." of the passbook, the court also observed that the "case is not con-
cerned with the rights of the parties with respect to a deposit while both live." In Austin
v. Summers, 237 S.C. 613, 118 S.E.2d 684 (1961), involving one contributing joint deposi-
tor and two non-contributing co-depositors, the court did not refer to the two non-con-
tributing co-depositors as "owners" of the account until after the death of the contribut-
ing joint depositor. The court also held that when one joint depositor, following the death
of another joint depositor (who furnished all the funds), withdrew all of the account pro-
ceeds, she was accountable to the other surviving joint depositors for half of the funds
withdrawn. These cases may indicate that during the life of a contributing joint deposi-
tor, a non-contributing joint depositor has a right to withdraw funds but remains ac-
countable and, therefore, is not a co-owner of the account. If this is the law in this state,
the Krakoff case is inapplicable because there was no property right to accept until the
death of the contributing joint depositor. The nature of the interest of a non-contributing
joint depositor prior to the death of a -,contributing depositor, however, is not clear. In
view of the lack of South Carolina decisions dealing with renunciations of joint accounts,
there may be a risk that the Krakoff case would be held applicable, with the result that a
disclaimer more than nine months after the account was created might be ineffective on
the grounds that there had been an acceptance by the non-contributing co-depositor. In
such event, a renunciation might result in a gift and a gift tax liability.
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The question of acceptance is essentially different from the
question of timeliness. The timeliness question concerns when
the property must be disclaimed: within the nine-month period
from the time that the interest was created or, in the case of
minors, nine months from age twenty-one." In the Krakoff case,
the bank account, for example, did not involve a completed gift
and so even if the Krakoff case had arisen after the effective date
of section 2518 of the 1976 Tax Reform Act, the nine-month time
limitation would not have run out. It would seem that but for
her prior acceptance, Anna's disclaimer should have been effec-
tive. Notwithstanding that fact, however, the Krakoff case may
be authority for the principle that a gift may be accepted for tax
purposes before it is completed for tax purposes.
3. By inaction.-A more troublesome question is whether
and to what extent acceptance can be based upon inaction. The
gift tax regulations provide: "In the absence of facts to the con-
trary, if a person fails to refuse to accept a transfer to him of
ownership of a decedent's property within a reasonable time af-
ter learning of the existence of the transfer, he will be presumed
to have accepted the transfer.""
If the philosophy embodied in the regulation is extended be-
yond instances of property received from a decedent under his
will, the result can be troublesome indeed. For example, after
the death of the insured, can the beneficiary of a life insurance
policy disclaim if he has been the beneficiary for many years?
Can the beneficiary of an unfunded revocable inter vivos insur-
ance trust disclaim after the settlor's death if he has been a ben-
eficiary of the trust for a long period of time?15 In either of these
cases, has there been an acceptance by the inaction of the bene-
63. I.R.C. § 2518(b)(4).
64. Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(c) (1958). In Larisey v. Larisey, 93 S.C. 450, 77 S.E. 129
(1913), the court observed in dictum: "In the absence of evidence to the contrary, it will
be presumed that the donee of valuable unencumbered property, conveyed without con-
dition, will accept the gift." Id. at 453, 77 S.E. at 130.
65. But see Rolin v. Comm'r, 68 T.C. 919, aff'd, 588 F.2d 368 (2d Cir. 1968). The tax
court held that Mrs. Rolin could disclaim her interest in the inter vivos trust because she
never accepted it during her lifetime. The trust was created by Mr. Rolin in 1958 and, at
that time, Mrs. Rolin was made a beneficiary, but was to receive no benefits therefrom
unless she survived her husband. Mr. Rolin died in 1968 and Mrs. Rolin died about four
months later, never having received any trust benefits. See also Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(d)-
1 (1958) (I.R.C. § 2056(d) having been repealed by the Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L.
No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520); Finnell, Disclaimers and the Marital Deduction: A Need for
Adequate State Legislation, 21 U. FLA. L. REv. 1, 35 (1968); notes 2 & 14 supra.
[Vol. 31
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ficiary? These unsettled questions indicate that extreme caution
should be exercised in the disclaimer of nontestamentary gifts.
E. Effectiveness Under Local Law
1. In general.-The final two-part requirement under sec-
tion 2518 is that, as a result of the disclaimer, the interest in
property passes (a) without any direction on the part of the dis-
claimant, and (b) to a person other than the disclaimant.6 The
first part of the requirement is that under local law the dis-
claimer must have been effective.67 More specifically, effective-
ness in this context means that by reason of a disclaimer title to
the property did not pass under local law to the disclaimant, but
instead passed to another. This requirement can be violated in
two ways. First, if the disclaimer is for any reason ineffective,"
then title is not rejected but instead vests in the purported dis-
claimant. Alternatively, title to the disclaimed property can be
effectively rejected, but by reason of other testamentary provi-
sions or by reason of intestacy, title can return to the disclai-
mant. As an example of the latter, assume A devises Black-
acre to B in Item III of A's will and in Item VII, which is a
residue provision, A bequeaths the balance of A's estate to B for
life, remainder to C. B disclaims the property described in Item
III but nevertheless receives a life interest in the disclaimed
property under Item VII. The question thus raised is: has B
made a qualified disclaimer because the entire interest in the
disclaimed property did not pass to a person other than the dis-
claimant?" Even more serious, has B made a gift of the remain-
der to C?
The statute, in certain cases, makes an exception to the re-
quirement that title pass to another. Suppose the decedent be-
queaths a life interest in certain property to his wife, remainder
to his brother. Wife and brother disclaim and as a result, the
66. For an exception to this, see § 2518(b)(4)(A).
67. I.R.C. § 2518(b)(4). See Estate of Newman, 38 T.C. 898 (1979); Private Letter
Ruling 7937011. But see II CCH ImN'EAL REVENUE MANUAL AuDrr 4316.12(3), which
states "[i]f the requirements of I.R.C. § 2518(b) are satisfied, a refusal to accept property
is deemed a qualified disclaimer regardless of state law."
68. For example, an attempt is made to disclaim intestate property in a jurisdiction
that does not permit such disclaimers. See Hardenbergh v. Comm'r, 198 F.2d 63 (8th Cir.
1942).
69. See I.R.C. § 2518(b)(4). See also ESTATE PLANNING, supra note 18, at 180.
1980]
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property passes under a residue clause to the wife. Despite the
requirement that the disclaimed property must pass to a person
other than the disclaimant, a special exception exists when the
spouse is concerned." Thus, in the case described above, the wife
would have disclaimed a life interest and received a fee simple
interest that would have qualified for the estate tax marital de-
duction. Her disclaimer in this instance would have been a qual-
ified disclaimer.
The second part of the requirement is that the disclaimant
cannot have controlled the subsequent devolution of the dis-
claimed property. Stated another way, the disclaimant cannot
disclaim in favor of some other person. The disclaimant must
exercise no control whatever over the subsequent devolution of
the property after it has been disclaimed.7 As will be evident
later,72 the effectiveness of a disclaimer under local law may de-
pend upon either the nature of the property interest being dis-
claimed or the method of disposition of the property to the
disclaimants.
2. Property interests that may be disclaimable.-It is well
established that certain kinds of disclaimers are permitted under
South Carolina property law 3 Nevertheless, it does not neces-
sarily follow that it is possible to disclaim property interests of
all kinds. Three South Carolina cases have dealt with the effec-
tiveness of disclaimers of devises and have permitted such dis-
claimers.74 Two of those cases also dealt favorably with the effec-
tiveness of disclaimers of personal property.75 The latest of those
cases7" went even further and permitted a disclaimer of a portion
but not all of the property passing under the residue provision of
a decedent's will. In the Bahan case, the decedent's surviving
spouse disclaimed (1) $150,000 out of $532,000 cash passing
70. I.R.C. § 2518(b)(4)(A).
71. Thus, the use of a quitclaim deed by a disclaimant to "insure" that he did not
have title to the disclaimed property could be fatal. Such a deed would be evidence of an
intent to receive and dispose of property, rather than an intent to reject it.
72. See text in Part IV.E.2.
73. Bahan v. Citizens & Southern Nat'l Bank of S.C., 267 S.C. 303, 227 S.E.2d 671
(1976); Watson v. Wall, 229 S.C. 500, 93 S.E.2d 918 (1956). See also Dabney v. Estes, 262
S.C. 336, 204 S.E.2d 387 (1974).
74. See cases cited in note 73 supra.
75. Bahan v. Citizens & Southern Nat'l Bank of S.C., 267 S.C. 303, 227 S.E.2d 671
(1976); Watson v. Wall, 229 S.C. 500, 93 S.E.2d 918 (1956).
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under the residue clause, (2) thirty shares out of eighty and one-
half shares of stock in the Bahan Textile and Machinery Com-
pany, Inc.; and (3) all of the decedent's one-quarter undivided
interest passing to her in a certain parcel of real property.
7
The Bahan case is instructive because of the variety of prop-
erty and interests in property permitted to be disclaimed. For
example, Bahan establishes a testamentary disclaimant's right
under local law to pick and choose property passing under a sin-
gle item of a will, accepting certain items of property and re-
jecting other items, as evidenced by the disclaimer of some but
not all of the cash passing under the will and the disclaimer of
some but not all the stock of a particular corporation.
3. Property interests that may not be disclaimable.-Al-
though the general rule is that a donee has the right to accept or
reject a gift of any kind of property, if the donee or legatee at-
tempts to accept an interest in part of the property and reject
the balance, problems arise. In some cases the courts have re-
fused to permit partial disclaimers on the ground that the gift
was not severable.7s
The Bahan case 79 has resolved in South Carolina some of the
local law problems of partial disclaimers by permitting certain
kinds of partial disclaimers. Other problems remain to be re-
solved. For example, although the court found in the Bahan case
that the disclaimer of a one-fourth undivided interest in certain
real property was effective, such one-fourth interest was the en-
tire interest owned by the decedent and the disclaimer by the
decedent's spouse did not create a fractional interest when none
existed before. The question therefore remains whether, for ex-
ample, B, a devisee of Blackacre under A's will, could disclaim
an undivided one-half interest as tenant in common and thus
create a fractional share interest when none had existed previ-
ously."0 Or, given the same example, could B disclaim a remain-
77. Warrant of Appraisement for the Estate of Edward F. Bahan, Deceased (on file,
Office of the Probate Judge, Greenville County, S.C., in apartment 1274, file 24). It has
been suggested that a partial disclaimer of this kind might not have been effective under
§ 2518. See J. MCCORD, supra note 18, at 253.
78. See, e.g., Bailey v. McLain, 215 N.C. 150, 1 S.E.2d 372 (1939). See also 6 PAGE
ON THE LAW OF WILLS, supra note 18, § 49.10.
79. Bahan v. Citizens & Southern Nat'l Bank of S.C., 267 S.C. 303, 227 S.E.2d 671
(1976).
80. See J. McCoRD, supra note 18, at 255.
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der interest in Blackacre, retaining a life interest?' In addition,
the effectiveness of certain kinds of partial disclaimers may also
be questionable under applicable provisions of federal tax laws.
Section 2518 treats the problem as follows: "A disclaimer with
respect to an undivided portion of an interest which meets the
requirements of the preceding sentence shall be treated as a
qualified disclaimer of such portion of the interest." 2
The first problem encountered in section 2518(c)(1) is
whether a remainder interest in property that has been dis-
claimed (a life interest having been accepted) can constitute an
"undivided portion of an interest." The answer would seem to be
negative, thus, such a disclaimer may be ineffective for tax pur-
poses, even if it is effective under local law.13 If that problem is
overcome, section 2518(c)(1) provides that the disclaimer of an
undivided portion must meet the requirements of section
2518(b). One of the provisions of section 2518(b) prohibits the
disclaimant from accepting the interest "or any of its benefits."
It is difficult to understand how B can disclaim a remainder in-
terest in Blackacre and accept a life estate without having ac-
cepted any of Blackacre's benefits.
Notwithstanding the problems of attempting to disclaim a
remainder and retain a life interest, what is permitted under sec-
tion 2518(c)(1) dealing with undivided portions? Does section
2518(c)(1) permit only the kind of disclaimer made by Mrs. Ba-
han (who received a one-fourth undivided interest in real prop-
erty and disclaimed it) or does it mean that, in the example pos-
ited above, B, the devisee of Blackacre, could disclaim a one-half
undivided interest therein, thus creating a fractional interest in
himself (and the taker by reason of the disclaimer) when none
previously existed (or was even intended by the testator)? It has
been suggested"4 that section 2518(c)(1) permits a disclaimant to
create an undivided interest under a disclaimer because section
2518(c)(1) was unnecessary to permit the kind of disclaimer
made by Mrs. Bahan when she received and disclaimed a one-
quarter interest in real property. However, in view of the "undi-
81. The Internal Revenue Service has refused to rule on this question. See Private
Letter Rulings 7922018, 7913082.
82. I.R.C. § 2518(c)(1).
83. In Private Letter Ruling 7922018, the Internal Revenue Service refused to rule on
this question, even though accepting a life interest was permitted under local law.
84. J. McCORD, supra note 18, at 255.
[Vol. 31
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vided portion" language of section 2518(c)(1), the effectivenes§
for tax purposes of a disclaimer of a specific sum out of a larger
cash bequest or a specific number of shares of stock out of a
larger block seems subject to question.s
4. Property dispositions that may be disclaimable. -Vol-
untary dispositions or transfers of property generally seem to be
disclaimable. Cases in South Carolina permitting testamentary
disclaimers have been discussed previously. 8 South Carolina
cases dealing with inter vivos gifts describe such gifts in terms of
agreements regarding which acceptance is required to complete
the gift.87 Implicit in these cases is the premise that if accept-
ance is required to make the gift complete, the donee is free not
to accept the gift. With the possible exception of partial dis-
claimers, all kinds of voluntarily transferred property interests
seem to be disclaimable and it is frequently the method of dispo-
sition or transfer to the potential disclaimant that impairs the
possibility of disclaiming.
5. Property dispositions that may not be disclaimable.
-Under the common law, intestate property could not be dis-
claimed." The rationale for such different treatment of intestate
property is based upon the fact that title to intestate property
passes by operation of law and an heir or distributee of intestate
property is said to be unable to prevent the passage of title to
property received by operation of law.89 The rule is said to have
its origin in feudal times and was based upon a policy that noth-
ing should be allowed to defeat the passage of title to the legiti-
mate heir.9
The Supreme Court of South Carolina has never expressed
an opinion on the effectiveness of a disclaimer of intestate prop-
erty. In the Bahan case the disclaiming spouse not only dis-
claimed certain portions of the property passing to her by will,
but fearing that her disclaimer would result in an intestacy or
85. Id.
86. See cases cited at note 73 supra.
87. Lynch v. Lynch, 201 S.C. 130, 21 S.E.2d 569 (1942); Ott v. Ott, 182 S.C. 35, 188
S.E. 789 (1898).
88. 6 PAGE ON THE LAW OF WMLS, supra note 18, § 49.1.
89. Id.
90. For a brief explanation of the development of this rule, see Heckerling, Dis-
claimer-A Useful Postmortem Estate Planning Tool, THE TAX AnvISER 182 n.5 (March
1970). A more detailed explanation is found in Lauritzen, Only God Can Make an Heir,
48 Nw. U.L. Rav. 568 (1953).
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partial intestacy, she also disclaimed her interest in any result-
ing intestacy as well.' Observing that it did not reach the ques-
tion of intestate disclaimers since it found no intestacy was cre-
ated, the court expressed no opinion on the validity of
disclaimers of intestate property.2
While it is clear under the common law that an heir cannot
disclaim intestate property, is that common-law rule now appli-
cable in this state? Until this question is squarely presented to
and answered by the Supreme Court of South Carolina, the an-
swer is unknown, but it seems unlikely in view of the great
weight of authority from other jurisdictions that the South Caro-
lina court would take a different position. "
V. DEVOLUTION OF DISCLAIMED PROPERTY UNDER LOCAL LAW
A. In General
If an inter vivos gift is disclaimed, it is an ineffective gift
and title to the property never leaves the donor. If the inter vivos
gift is in trust, and there are substitute beneficiaries, it is possi-
ble that a disclaimed gift may devolve to the substitutes. Prop-
erty transfers caused by death will always effect a change in the
title to the property, even when the first taker rejects or dis-
claims it. Because the devolution of property following a dis-
claimer is frequently of prime importance to the potential dis-
91. Bahan v. Citizens & Southern Nat'l Bank of S.C., 267 S.C. 303, 306, 227 S.E.2d
671, 672 (1976).
92. Id.
93. See Brief of Appellant at 10, Bahan v. Citizens & Southern Nat'l Bank of S.C.,
267 S.C. 303, 227 S.E.2d 671 (1976). In their brief to the Supreme Court of South Caro-
lina, attorneys for the plaintiff-appellant, Mrs. Bahan, presented an interesting argu-
ment. They cited S.C. CONST. art. X, § 5 (1790): "The legislature shall, as soon as may
be convenient, pass laws for the abolition of the rights of primogeniture and for giving an
equitable distribution of the real estate of intestates." Such an act was adopted in 1791
and provided that "[w]hen any person. . . shall die without disposing [of real estate] by
will, the same shall be distributed in the following manner. . . ." 5 STATUTS AT LARGE
OF SOUTH CAROLINA 162, Act No. 1489 (1791). S.C. CODE ANN. § 21-3-20 (1976) is the
current statute of descent and distribution. The brief asserted that in view of the "abol-
ishment of common law concepts," the court must construe the "Statutes of Descents
and statutory provisions ancillary thereto . . ." to determine the effectiveness of a dis-
claimer of an intestate interest. The brief then cited the statute on advancements, S.C.
CODE ANN. § 21-3-60 (1976), as an indication that variations from the Statute of Descents
were permitted. The brief concluded that since the applicable common-law principles
had been abolished, there was no reason not to permit the disclaimer of an intestate
interest. However, the Supreme Court of South Carolina did not reach the question. 267
S.C. at 307, 227 S.E.2d at 672.
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claimant and, in many cases, is critical with respect to a desired
tax benefit, a familiarity with some of the more common rules of
devolution and variations therefrom is essential.
B. Testate Property
If property under a will provision is disclaimed, whether or
not it becomes intestate property may depend upon the nature of
the property interest given, the presence or absence of other will
provisions, and the existence and applicability of remedial state
statutes.
1. The substituted beneficiary.-It is not uncommon for a
testator to make a gift under his will to a beneficiary and to fur-
ther provide that if the beneficiary does not survive, the gift
passes to another beneficiary. These were the facts of the Ba-
han 4 case. Mr. Bahan's will bequeathed the residue of his estate
to his wife if she survived him, but if she did not, then to his
adopted son. Mrs. Bahan disclaimed a portion of the residue and
one of the issues presented to the court was whether the dis-
claimed property became intestate property or passed to the sub-
stitute beneficiary, the adopted son. The court found that the
disclaimed property passed to the adopted son even though the
gift to the son was conditioned upon Mrs. Bahan's death prior to
the decedent, Mr. Bahan15 In fact, Mrs. Bahan survived Mr. Ba-
han. The court observed that although death was the only ex-
press provision applicable to a lapse of the residuary gift to Mrs.
Bahan, "the language clearly shows that the testator intended to
dispose therein of 'all the remainder of my estate, including both
real and personal property.' , Based upon this finding, the
court concluded:
It is unreasonable to assume that, having disposed of the entire
remainder of the estate to his wife and in the event of her death
to the adopted son, that testator intended that any of his estate
should pass to these same persons as intestate property ....
Although a lapse of the residuary estate by ... disclaimer was
not expressly anticipated by the testator, a possible lapse in
the event of the death of the wife was contemplated, resulting
94. Bahan v. Citizens & Southern Nat'l Bank of S.C., 267 S.C. 303, 227 S.E.2d 671
(1976).
95. Id. at 310, 227 S.E.2d at 674.
96. Id. (quoting without citing testator's will).
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in the designation of the adopted son to receive the estate. We
agree . . . that the testator intended for the adopted son to re-
ceive the residuary estate in 'the event the wife failed to take for
any reason."
The same rationale could have been applied, but was not, in
a case involving the South Carolina Bastardy Act." In Ray v.
Tate99 the testator died leaving surviving lawful children but be-
queathing his entire estate to his mistress. His will further pro-
vided that if the mistress did not survive him, his entire estate
was to pass to the niece of the mistress. The testator's children,
pursuant to the Bastardy Act,10° had the excess over twenty-five
percent of the gift to the mistress declared void. In this manner,
the question of the devolution of the excess was presented. The
supreme court held that the niece of the mistress did not take
the excess because the gift to her was conditioned upon the
death of the mistress prior to the testator, which did not occur. 0'
The court held that the excess over twenty-five percent of the
gift to the mistress became intestate property and passed to the
children of the testator. 02
2. Anti-lapse statutes. -Another problem in predicting the
devolution of property after a disclaimer arises out of the appli-
cation of South Carolina's anti-lapse statute. °'03 Under the anti-
lapse statute, if a testator bequeaths or devises property to a
child and the child predeceases the testator leaving issue, the
property bequeathed or devised to the predeceased child passes
instead to that child's issue. The question is, does the anti-lapse
statute apply when instead of dying the child disclaims the
property?
The anti-lapse statute is conditioned upon the death of the
child prior to the testator. It would seem that since the statute is
in derogation of the common law, it should be narrowly con-
strued."4 The statute therefore should not apply to a disclaimer.
97. Id.
98. S.C. CODE ANN. § 21-7-480 (1976).
99. 272 S.C. 472, 252 S.E.2d 568 (1979).
100. S.C. CODE ANN. § 21-7-480 (1976).
101. 272 S.C. at 476, 252 S.E.2d at 570.
102. Id.
103. S.C. CODE ANN. § 21-7-470 (1976).
104. Major v. Nat'l Indem. Co., 267 S.C. 517, 229 S.E.2d 849 (1976); Powell v.
Greenwood County, 189 S.C. 463, 1 S.E.2d 624 (1939).
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3. Joint tenancies with right of survivorship.-The nature
of an interest given under a will can also affect its devolution in
the event of a disclaimer. More specifically, the devolution of an
interest as a joint tenant differs from the devolution of an inter-
est as a tenant in common if one of several such beneficiaries
predeceases the testator or disclaims.
Under the applicable South Carolina statute,"' the com-
mon-law form of ownership known as joint tenancy with right of
survivorship has been modified to remove the right of survivor-
ship. The statute, by its express terms, does not apply if the
right of survivorship has been expressly provided for in the in-
strument that created the joint tenancy.
Thus, assume that A's will in Item III leaves Blackacre to B
and C as joint tenants with right of survivorship and in Item VII
leaves the residue of the estate to D. If B predeceases A, B dies
owning an interest as joint tenant with a right of survivorship.
Consequently, as surviving tenant, C, who survives A, takes the
entire interest in Blackacre under his right of survivorship. The
interest does not lapse and does not pass under the residue
clause to D. Presumably, a disclaimer by B would have a similar
result.
4. Class gifts.-Similar problems arise upon the disclaimer
of a class gift by a member of the class. Do the other members of
the class take the disclaimed property or is it considered prop-
erty undisposed of and does it, therefore, pass under a residue
clause, or as intestate property if there is no residue clause? The
question is further complicated by the anti-lapse statute 6 (if the
class is a class of the testator's children) since it is not known
whether the anti-lapse statute applies to class gifts. 07
5. Life estates. -Disclaiming life estates also involves sub-
stantial complexities. A basic question is whether, upon the dis-
claimer of a life estate, remainders are accelerated. The general
rule seems to be that when the disclaimed life estate is followed
by a vested remainder, the remainder is accelerated."' In other
instances, such as when contingent remainders exist, accelera-
105. S.C. CODE ANN. § 21-3-50 (1976).
106. S.C. CODE ANN. § 21-7-470 (1976).
107. T. ATKINSON, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF WULS § 140, at 782 (2d ed. 1953). See
Annot., 56 A.L.R.2d 948 (1957).
108. Key v. Weathersby, 43 S.C. 414, 21 S.E. 824 (1895); 2A R. PoWELL, THE LAW OF
REAL PROPERTY 309[5] (P. Roban ed. 1977).
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tion may not be permitted.' 9
6. Residue provisions.-It is an accepted rule of will con-
struction in South Carolina and elsewhere that the courts pre-
sume a testator did not intend to die intestate or partially intes-
tate; as a result, residue provisions are construed to avoid partial
or complete intestacies."10 Thus, if a testator has given the resi-
due of his estate to two persons, and one predeceases him, it
seems reasonable to assume that he probably intended for the
survivor to take all of the property passing under the residue
provision. Such a construction would seem to be in accord with
the presumption against intestacy or partial intestacy."' Never-
theless, unless there are express provisions for substituted benefi-
ciaries, or the anti-lapse statute applies, or the residuary legatees
constitute a class, there will be a lapse and a resulting intestacy
or partial intestacy."'
Similarly, when there are two or more residuary benefi-
ciaries and one disclaims, in the absence of a class gift, the ap-
plication of the anti-lapse statute, or a substituted beneficiary,
intestacy will result. A general residue provision, however, will
prevent intestacy or partial intestacy with respect to property
disclaimed in preceding provisions of the will."'
C. Intestate Property
A disclaimer of property under a will may not achieve any-
thing if it creates an intestacy and as a result the disclaimed
property is routed back to the disclaiming party by operation of
law. In the Bahan"I case, because of uncertainty as to whether
the disclaimed property would pass by intestacy or to the substi-
tuted beneficiary, Mrs. Bahan disclaimed not only her testate,
but her intestate interest as well. Because the court found no
intestacy was created, "1 it did not rule upon the question of dis-
109. Burkhalter v. Breeden, 162 S.C. 64, 160 S.E. 165 (1931); 2A R. PowELL, supra
note 108, 1310.
110. Watson v. Wall, 229 S.C. 500, 516, 93 S.E.2d 918, 926 (1956).
111. Id.
112. Padgett v. Black, 229 S.C. 142, 92 S.E.2d 153 (1956); Davis v. Davis, 208 S.C.
182, 37 S.E.2d 530 (1946).
113. Watson v. Wall, 229 S.C. 500, 517, 93 S.E.2d 918, 927 (1956).
114. Bahan v. Citizens & Southern Nat'l Bank of S.C., 267 S.C. 303, 306-07, 227
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claimers of intestate property. However, in considering whether
or not to disclaim property, the potential disclaimant should de-
termine whether the disclaimer will create an intestacy and, if it
does, whether the taker under the intestacy statutes will be a
satisfactory recipient (i.e., someone other than the disclaimant).
Additionally, if the disclaimed property will be returned to the
disclaimant under the intestacy statute, the potential disclaim-
ant must then consider whether to test the nondisclaimability
rule of intestate property in the South Carolina courts.
In some cases, the testate disclaimant may be satisfied to
have the disclaimed property returned to him as intestate prop-
erty because it may be freed from certain restrictions, contingen-
cies, or obligations. For example, a surviving spouse's testamen-
tary life estate, which would constitute a "terminable interest"
(and would not qualify for the estate tax marital deduction),
under some circumstances can be disclaimed by the surviving
spouse and the remainderman, resulting in an intestate share for
the surviving spouse that is not terminable and which will qual-
ify for the estate tax marital deduction. This procedure is per-
mitted by section 2518(b)(4), but only as to a surviving spouse.
Persons who wish to test the rule of nondisclaimability of
intestate property should consider carefully the pattern of the in-
testacy statute."' For example, assume that A dies intestate
leaving a wife and two adult children. The children desire that
their mother take the entire estate and they disclaim, believing
this to be the result in the case of a disclaimer of their interests.
Even assuming the effectiveness of the children's disclaimer of
intestate property under local law, however, the mother would
not receive the property disclaimed by them unless the following
persons did not survive the decedent: (1) lineal descendants of
the children; (2) parents of the decedent; (3) brothers and sisters
of the whole blood or the half blood; (4) children of whole blood
brothers and sisters; and (5) lineal ancestors."17 On the other
hand, if the wife should (and effectively could) disclaim her in-
testate share, under the intestacy statute the children would
take her entire interest."s
116. S.C. CODE ANN. § 21-3-20 (1976).
117. Id. § 21-3-20(6) (1976).
118. Id. § 21-3-20(1), (7) (1976).
19801
25
Moses: Renunciations and Disclaimers under South Carolina Law
Published by Scholar Commons, 1980
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REvIEw
VI. EFFECTIVENESS OF STATE-COURT DECISIONS
Because the devolutionary result and tax effect of a dis-
claimer are so dependent upon state law, a correct analysis of
state law is absolutely critical to any consideration of whether a
disclaimer should be made. For this reason, a potential disclaim-
ant will sometimes resort to a declaratory judgment in order to
under local property and tax laws. If a declaratory judgment is
to be obtained, the disclaimant should be aware of the influence
of state-court decisions in federal tax matters. In the Bosch"9
case the United States Supreme Court announced the rule that
state-court decisions on matters of local law would not be bind-
ing upon the federal courts in tax matters unless such decisions
had been made by the state's highest court.'20 In order to bind
the Internal Revenue Service under this rule, it seems necessary
to successfully appeal any declaratory judgment to the Supreme
Court of South Carolina.
Notwithstanding the Bosch case, however, Revenue Ruling
73-14212I indicated that the decisions of lower courts, insofar as
they have a prospective application, will be respected by and
binding on the Service. Under the facts of the revenue ruling, a
decedent created a trust reserving the right to remove or dis-
charge the trustee at any time and with no express limitation on
appointing himself as trustee. In the trust instrument, the trus-
tee had the unrestricted power to withhold distribution of in-
come or principal and to apportion between income and princi-
pal, notwithstanding any rules of law to the contrary which
would apply in the absence of overriding trust provisions. Ordi-
narily, the decedent's right to appoint himself as trustee and to
exercise the powers described above would be sufficient to in-
clude the value of the trust property in the decedent's gross es-
tate for federal estate tax purposes under section 2036(a)(2) and
possibly also under section 2038. Before his death, however, the
decedent, in a nonadversary action, obtained a lower state-court
ruling that the power to appoint a new trustee could be exercised
only once and that such power did not include the right to ap-
point himself as trustee. The revenue ruling observed that the
119. Commissioner v. Bosch, 387 U.S. 456 (1967).
120. Id. at 462-66.
121. Rev. Rul. 73-142, 1973-1 C.B. 405.
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decree appeared to be contrary to the decisions of the highest
court of the state. The revenue ruling adverted to the Bosch
case, but observed, in effect, that the lower-court ruling was the
"law of the case" and therefore binding upon the parties. The
ruling concluded:
In this case the lower court had jurisdiction over the par-
ties and over the subject matter of the proceeding. Thus, the
time for appeal having elapsed, its judgment is final and con-
clusive as to those parties, regardless of how erroneous the
court's application of the state law may have been. Conse-
quently, after the time for appeal had expired, the grantor-de-
cedent did not have the power to appoint himself as successor
trustee. The aforesaid rights and powers which would otherwise
have brought the value of the trust corpus within the provisions
of sections 2036 and 2038 of the Code were thus effectively cut
off before his death.
Unlike the situation in Bosch, the decree in this case was
handed down before the time of the event giving rise to the tax
(that is, the date of the grantor's death). Thus, while the de-
cree would not be binding on the government as to questions
relating to the grantor's power to appoint himself as trustee
prior to the date of the decree, it is controlling after such date
since the decree, in and of itself, effectively extinguished the
power. In other words, while there may have been a question
whether the grantor had such a power prior to the decree, there
is no question that he did not have the power thereafter.
Accordingly, it is held that the value of the property trans-
ferred to the inter vivos trust is not includible in the grantor-
decedent's gross estate under § 2036 or § 2038 of the Code.'22
Under the foregoing ruling, the prospective effect of lower-court
decisions which define the rights of potential disclaimants may
be respected by the government.
VII. REVOKING DISCLAIMER
In view of the many subtle pitfalls which lie in wait for the
disclaimant, it is surprising that there are not more decisions re-
garding the right of the disclaimant, with the approval of the
courts, to set aside disclaimers improvidently given. A dis-
claimer is essentially the exercise of an election by a recipient of
122. Id. at 406.
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property not to take the property. The traditional rule on revok-
ing elections is illustrated by the case of Libbey v. Frost'2 and
deals with elections rather than disclaimers. The court in that
case held an election made with full knowledge of the facts
would not be set aside.'
24
Nevertheless, a somewhat different rule has developed re-
garding the revocation of disclaimers. The general rule appears
to permit the revocation of a disclaimer unless, after the dis-
claimer has been made but prior to its revocation, there was a
change of position. 12 The case of Job Haines Home For Aged
People v. Keene' 6 illustrates the principle. However, an election
that causes a substantial change of position cannot be revoked
subsequently. In Mahaney v. Mahaney'27 the court said it would
permit the revocation of a disclaimer because the disclaimant
made it "under a misunderstanding as to his rights. .... 12
The English case of In re Young' 2' is an illustration of the
permissible revocation of a disclaimer of a legacy. The plaintiff
in that case, entitled to income for life, at first rejected the leg-
acy and then retracted her rejection. The court permitted the
retraction, commenting: "Why should not the disclaimer of a
legacy be withdrawn if there has been no change of position
among the parties interested?"'' 13
If a tax benefit has been obtained by reason of a disclaimer,
the government arguably would be an interested party that
would have changed its position. Accordingly, the disclaimer
would appear to have become irrevocable, thus satisfying the ir-
revocability requirement of section 2518.
The cases discussed indicate that in instances of an improvi-
dently given disclaimer, prompt action to revoke it may in some
cases at least prevent matters from worsening.
123. 98 Me. 288, 56 A. 906 (1904). See 80 AM. JUR. 2d Wills § 1634 (1975).
124. 98 Me. at 291, 56 A. at 907.
125. 1 A. Scorr, TRusTS § 36.1 (3d ed. 1967); G. BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRusTEEs § 170
(2d rev. ed. 1979).
126. 87 N.J. Eq. 500, 101 A. 512 (1917).
127. 91 N.J. Eq. 473, 110 A. 15 (1920).
128. Id. at 475, 110 A. at 16.
129. [1913] 1 Ch. 272.
130. [d. at 274. See also In re Cranstoun's Will, [1949] 1 Ch. 871, in which the court
followed the case of In re Young and complained of the "scanty material available on this
principal of renunciation . . . ." Id. at 873.
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VIII. WHO CAN DIsCImmM?
If the proposed recipient of a gift is sui juris, the disclaimer
of property should be made by the disclaimant personally. But
what is the result if the proposed recipient is deceased, incompe-
tent, or has appointed an agent? Some states by statute permit
a disclaimer by a personal representative. 3' Without such statu-
tory authority, the right to disclaim in a representative capacity
is not so clear. In one case decided after the adoption of section
2518, but involving facts all of which occurred before that date,"'32
the United States Tax Court observed that under the common
law of New York the right of renunciation is not a personal one
and, therefore, the renunciation of interest in a trust by the
decedent's executors was valid. The decision also was based in
part upon language in the trust permitting the disclaimer by the
decedent or her executors and language in the decedent's will
authorizing her executors to disclaim.
The question remains, however, whether in South Carolina a
disclaimer by a personal representative of a decedent can be ef-
fected. One imminent authority has stated rather unequivocably
that "unless a contrary intention is indicated by the provisions
of the will, the right of acceptance or renunciation is not ended
by the death of the devisee or legatee who had such right."',
Other authorities are less certain.' 34 If the right to renounce is
not a personal right, it may be also delegable under a durable
power of attorney to another in order to provide for the possible
incapacity of the principal.'
3 5
IX. CONCLUSION
Any study of the statutes and cases dealing with disclaimers
leads to a number of conclusions, prominent among which are
the following: (1) the relevant tax laws in many instances are
uncertain in application and the relevant property laws are vir-
tually nonexistent in South Carolina; (2) the rewards of dis-
131. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 113-824(a) (1975). See also L. NEWMAN & A. KALTER,
supra note 6, at 25.
132. 68 T.C. 275 No. 81 (1977).
133. 6 PAGE ON THE LAW OF WIS, supra note 7, § 49.5.
134. L. NEWMAN & A. KALTER, supra note 6, at 24, 38.
135. Moses & Pope, Estate Planning, Disability and the Durable Power of Attorney,
30 S.C.L. REV. 511, 537 (1979).
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claiming can be enormous; (3) the disclaimer traps are horren-
dous and frequently well concealed; (4) a good, comprehensive
South Carolina disclaimer statute would be extremely helpful;
and (5) the lawyer's best tool in the area is "a constant feeling of
sheer terror."'
' 36
136. Statement attributed to Charles H. Randall, Professor of Law, University of
South Carolina School of Law (taken only slightly out of context).
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STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA )
) DISCLAIMER
COUNTY OF )
This is a disclaimer of property passing under the Will of
(the "Decedent").
WHEREAS, the Decedent died on , 19_,
leaving a will (the "Will") which was duly admitted to probate
in the County Probate Court and is there on file
in Box __, Package _; and
WHEREAS, the undersigned is entitled to receive under
said Will an interest in certain property of the Decedent; and
WHEREAS, the undersigned desires to disclaim his interest
in certain property (the "Property") described on Exhibit "A"
attached hereto which he is entitled to receive under the Will;
and
WHEREAS, the undersigned has not accepted the Property
or any of its benefits.
NOW, THEREFORE, this disclaimer of the Property:
WITNESSETH:
The undersigned, for himself and his heirs, without receipt
of any consideration of any kind therefore, hereby renounces,
rejects, forever disclaims and absolutely refuses to accept all
interests of all and every kind in the Property and every benefit
therefrom, such renunciation, rejection, disclaimer and refusal to
accept being made irrevocably, without qualification, and prior to
the acceptance of the Property and/or any of its benefits.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned, for himself and
his heirs, has executed and delivered this Disclaimer to the Dece-





Moses: Renunciations and Disclaimers under South Carolina Law
Published by Scholar Commons, 1980




The undersigned (executor/administrator) of the (Will/ Es-
tate) of acknowledges receipt of the within
Disclaimer this - day of ,_19____ .
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